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FISCAL POLICY IN NEW EU MEMBER STATES 




The European Union (EU) accepted ten new member states (NMS) in 2004. These 
countries, mostly former socialist countries, have had to adjust their economic policies to the 
EU’s standards. Perhaps most difficult has proven to be fiscal policy whereby NMS must 
comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules. Indeed, six out of the ten NMS have 
breached the SGP limits and were put in Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). While the SGP 
is being modified, fiscal policy is set to remain on the agenda for all NMS in years to come.  
In this paper, we analyze fiscal policy in the NMS, focusing primarily on the time 
period that immediately preceded their EU accession. We analyse the structure and scale of 
these countries’ fiscal policy and identify main trends in revenues and expenditures of their 
public budgets. We then explore dynamics of fiscal policy in the new member states and 
isolate main factors of the dynamics. Namely, we show how much of the consolidations was 
due to the fiscal authorities’ effort and how much was caused by external factors. We also 
show that most NMS governments have run a rather inconsistent fiscal policy and have not 
consolidated their budgets appropriately by postponing politically difficult consolidation 
measures. However, we also identify a group of countries characterised by strong reform 
efforts and responsible fiscal policy-making, supported usually by strong economic growth. In 
this context, room is given to economic, as well as political economy factors. 
JEL Code: E6, E62, H2, H6, H87. 
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Fiscal policy remains one of the most intriguing fields of economic theory and policy. 
The economic theory, in particular, stresses that fiscal policy is better conducted within a 
framework of ex-ante defined rules. However, real world policy-makers still seem happy to 
ignore this conclusion and prefer discretion to rules. Nowhere is this gap as visible as in the 
group of countries that have just become members of the European Union (EU).
1 These 
countries run fiscal policy that is torn between (apparent) needs of the society still suffering 
from the transition-associated costs and used to high social transfers and rather rigid and 
demanding rules for fiscal policy within the EU. The NMSs cope with these demands in 
strikingly different ways and with very uneven results. We try to analyse roots and reasons of 
this diversity of the NMSs’ fiscal policies. 
The paper discusses the apparent emergence of two groups within the NMSs with 
respect to fiscal policy. Six out of the ten NMSs have not managed to cut their general 
government deficits
2 below 3 % of GDP and thus has been found to violate prescripts of 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and has been subsequently put under Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) in July 2004. Four countries, on the other hand, fare rather well vis-à-vis the 
SGP rules and have very low government debts. We try to answer the intrigue question what 
had made the authorities in the first group to ignore the well-known fact that they would be 
required to comply with SGP.
3 
To that end, the paper analyses in what aspects do NMSs differ in composition of the 
revenue and expenditure sides of the budget and what main determining factors have shaped 
their fiscal policy. Second, the paper compares fiscal policy in NMSs to fiscal policy in old 
EU member states (EUR-15). Third, we identify major reforms that have already been 
concluded in NMS and analyse in what respect experience of EUR-15 applies to NMSs. 
Throughout our work, we focus predominantly, though not exclusively, on the time period 
2001 through 2004, i.e. on time period which immediately preceded NMSs’ EU accession. 
It is fair to acknowledge, that any attempt to analyse fiscal policy is bound to be 
limited by several challenges. The most acute challenge concerns the accessibility of reliable 
data, which would span for reasonably long period enabling us to identify main trends of 
fiscal policy in NMSs and at the same time would have appropriate structure with respect to 
main revenue and expenditure aggregates of NMSs’ budgets. For this reason we rely on the 
data from European Commission (2004b) which span from early 1990’s till 2006. The 
                                                 
1 The ten NMS are Cyprus (CY); Czech Republic (CZ); Estonia (EE); Hungary (HU); Latvia (LV); 
Lithuania (LT); Malta (MT); Poland (PL); Slovenia (SI); and Slovakia (SK). All became members of the 
European Union in May 2004 and we will call them throughout the paper New Member States (NMSs). Only 
Cyprus and Malta had not been members of the socialist, Soviet-run system that collapsed in 1989. 
2 In what follows, when we refer to government, we mean always general government. 
3 All NMSs with respect to SGP are classified as “member states with derogation”, which means that 
those countries are expected to comply with SGP limits for government budget deficit of 3 % GDP and 
government debt of 60 % of GDP. Although they can not be fined for breaching those limits, they are put under 
EDP and subsequent intensified fiscal surveillance process and can be prohibited to draw financial resources 
from EU Cohesion Fund (see European Commission (2004a), pp. 69-72, for details). Awareness of NMSs of the 
fact that they would be obliged to comply with SGP rules is apparent from Pre-Accession Economic 
Programmes for year 2001. 
- 2 - predicted values for 2005 and 2006 are based on the European Commission’s (EC) forecasts 
that are based, in turn, on fiscal plans submitted by member states. Data used in this paper are 
based on autumn 2004 governments’ fiscal notifications and therefore for year 2004 present 
expected values and for years 2005 and 2006 present predictions of EC. 
Bearing all the qualifications in mind, we proceed as follows. In the next part, we 
discuss more closely position of NMSs at the beginning of the accession process and we 
identify two distinct groups within the NMS. In the third part, we present some stylized facts 
about NMSs public budgets, their expenditure and revenue structure and dynamics and about 
budget deficits and government debts in those countries. In the fourth part, we look more 
closely on the underlying forces that contributed to reduction (or expansion) in budget deficits 
in NMSs, using growth accounting technique pioneered by Hagen, Hallett and Strauch 
(2001). We also analyse to what extent the NMS have run a countercyclical fiscal policy. The 
fifth part analyses politics of fiscal consolidations and the following section investigates into 
more detail periods of fiscal consolidations in NMSs. Seventh part concludes the paper by 
presenting some insights from the EUR-15 pre-euro adoption period. 
II. FISCAL POLICY’S MAIN PATTERNS IN THE NMSs 
While often taken as a homogenous group, it is fair to acknowledge that the NMSs 
started from a very different set up. Some countries were free of any government debt 
(Estonia, Czech Republic), some had accumulated rather significant debts (Hungary 74 % of 
GDP, Cyprus more than 60 %). The NMSs have differed in the conduct of fiscal policy as 
well. Estonia has never had a bigger deficit than 3,7 % in one exceptional year; similarly 
Slovenia has crossed the 3 % threshold just once in 2000. Other countries have run much 
more adventurous fiscal policy: the biggest deficit in the Czech Republic and Slovakia was 12 
% of GDP, 10 % in Malta and 9 % in Hungary – see tables in the appendix. 
Perhaps most importantly, though, the ten NMSs differ in the size of their respective 
governments’ budgets. The two groups of countries emerge: Small and Big governments. The 
group of Small(ish) governments consists of the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) and Slovakia. The Big governments group consists of the remaining six countries: 
Central European four (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) plus two little 
Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. While the former group now (in 2004) spends 
36-38 % of their respective GDPs through the government, the latter group is characterised by 
the government share of 46-52 % in GDP. The gap is thus noticeable and significant – see the 
chart 1. 
It may be interesting to note that only Slovakia has managed to move from the Big to 
the Small Government group – see chart 1. Its expenditures fell from 54 % of GDP in 1995 
(and even 65 % in 1997, at the height of the Meciar’s government) to 38 % now, one of the 
most pronounced government’s shrinkage in history.
4 
                                                 
4 This remarkable performance remains open to re-interpretations, though. As some papers in this issue argue, 
the Slovak reforms are far from being concluded and some data are better taken and interpreted carefully. 
- 3 - On the other hand, Cypriot government used to spend about 38 % of the country’s 
GDP in the 1990’s, but the share increased to 46 % in 2003. The other Mediterranean island – 
Malta – has shared similar fiscal increase: from about 42 % of GDP to 50 % now. 
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With respect to public budget deficits, the group make-up is only marginally different. 
The group of Big deficit countries
5 consists of the same countries as the group of Big 
governments, only Slovakia substitutes for Slovenia that has moved to the group of countries 
with deficits within the SGP rules. Slovakia, however, has been approaching the SGP limits 
rather quickly in recent years. The correlation between low deficit and (relatively) low 
government expenditures suggests that conduct and quality of fiscal policy does differ 
between the two groups of countries. 
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We can, thus, speculate that there are two groups of countries within the ten NMSs. 
One relies on higher government expenditures and runs more pronounced budget deficits. 
This group consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Cyprus and Malta. The second 
group, represented by the three Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – is 
characterised by lower government budget share in GDP and by low budget deficits. The two 
countries are somewhat between these two groups: Slovenia has high and stable government 
expenditures, but it still manages to keep its budget deficit under control. Slovakia, on the 
                                                 
5 We use the deficit criterion in the following chapters, as we denote “EDP countries” or “EDP” for 
short those countries that have been found to violate SGP and has been put under EDP in July 2004 (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia). The second group “non EDP countries” or “non EDP” 
for short consists of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
- 4 - other hand, used to be synonymous with unsustainable fiscal policy, but has turned out to be 
the most fervour reformer within the NMSs. It has eliminated a substantial part of government 
expenditures and limited its budget deficits within the reach of the SGP limit of 3 % of GDP. 
In the following text, we will use the deficit-based division of the NMS, dividing the 
NMSs into the “EDP” and “non-EDP” groups. While we lose some information by presenting 
only average numbers for both groups, this division allows us to make discussion of various 
fiscal policies manageable. Our division might also seem odd since it is based solely on 
budget deficit in NMSs in year 2004. However, the very fact that governments in EDP 
countries were not able to cut their deficits below 3 % of GDP reveals some information 
about fiscal policy making in EDP countries. However, even when we used the division of 
NMSs according to the size of the government, our results did not change significantly. 
III. FISCAL POLICY STRUCTURE IN THE NMS’s 
This section presents more detailed data on fiscal developments in the NMSs since 
1995. The chapter analyses aggregate data on revenues and expenditures, but we also 
decompose these aggregates as to identify main drivers of fiscal developments. The main 
features of the decade 1995-2005 are a slow decrease in government expenditures and, even 
smaller, fall in government revenues in the NMS. The developments have been more volatile 
in the EDP group of countries that have witnessed shrinkage by about 6 % of GDP both in 
expenditures and revenues. The non EDP group, on the other hand, has enjoyed more stability 
and has not changed its relative budget size. 
New and old EU members 
First, look in more details on the share of government revenues in GDP in the NMS 
and in the old EU members (EUR-15). Taken the NMS as one group, the revenue share has 
declined gradually by about 3 % of GDP since 1995 till 2003 and is expected to increase 
slightly over next few years, which reflects mainly expected increase in revenues of EDP 
countries. At the same time, comparison to EUR-15 reveals, that revenue in NMSs has been 
on average 5 % of GDP lower for the whole period with maximum difference in years 1999 
and 2000 given mainly by the exceptional rise of revenues in EUR-15 in the run up to the 
euro adoption. 
Government expenditures in NMSs have also declined gradually since 1995 from 
46 % to about 44 % in 2005. Again, comparing NMSs to EUR-15, government expenditures 
were on average 4 % of GDP lower, with difference somehow higher since beginning of this 
century which is given by exceptional increase of expenditures in EUR-15. 
Development of government expenditures and revenues translated into government 
budget deficits in NMSs, rising from moderate average of around 2 % of GDP in years 1997 
and 1998 to deficits around 4 % of GDP since 2000. As NMSs boosted their expenditures in 
2002, the deficit ballooned to 4,5 % of GDP on average. Thus, NMSs on average do not 
comply with SGP and their non-compliance has increased almost exactly at the moment of 
their accession. 
Comparing development of government budget deficits in NMSs to development in 
EUR-15, budget deficit were on average higher in NMSs since 1998 and the difference 
- 5 - reached its maximum in year 2000, which was the year when government budget deficit 
remained at about 4 % of GDP in NMSs on the one hand and was the only year since 1995 
when EUR-15 governments managed to bring their budgets into surplus on the other. 
High deficits in NMSs translated into rising indebtness of those countries, although 
still relatively low when compared to EUR-15. The average debt increased from less than 
30 % in 1996 to 40 % now. The EUR-15 debt, on the other hand, was falling in the mid 
1990’s but then stabilised at about 64 % of GDP – see tables in the appendix. 
The EDP and non-EDP countries 
We now turn to differences in major 
fiscal aggregates of the EDP and non EDP 
countries. As is apparent from the chart 3, 
government expenditures in EDP countries 
developed similarly as in the EUR-15. They 
have oscillated around the level of 46 % of 
GDP and after increase in years 2000-2003 
are expected to decline in the future. On the 
other hand, government expenditures in non 
EDP countries have remained approximately 6 % of GDP below the level of expenditures in 
EDP countries and in contrast to them, declined in the period 2000 through 2003. 
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Source: European Commission (2004b) 
As regards government revenues in EDP countries, it remained more or less steady 
through the last decade at around 42 % of 
GDP, although there is a jump of 1,5 % of 
GDP between years 2003 and 2004. 
Government revenues of EDP countries have 
been by about 4 % below the EUR-15 level 
but about 4 % above government revenues in 
the non EDP countries – see chart 4. 
Structure of tax systems 
Concentrating only on major fiscal 
aggregates presents too an inadequate picture of the fiscal policy in NMSs. Therefore we 
analyse indirect taxation revenues (mainly value added tax (VAT) and specific commodity 
taxes), direct taxation revenues (mainly corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income tax 
(PIT)) and social security revenues (mainly contributions to the pension, health and other 
social insurance systems). 
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- 6 - Judging NMSs according to percentage of their revenues that comes from indirect 
taxation, it is apparent that until 
approximately 2002, there has been no 
significant difference between EDP, non EDP 
and EUR-15 countries in this respect. 
Beginning in 2003, EDP countries 
experienced higher revenue from indirect 
taxation which climbed above 14 % of GDP, 
possibly reflecting first attempts of policy-
makers of EDP countries to cut budget deficit 
below SGP 3 % of GDP benchmark. On the 
other hand, share of GDP raised through indirect taxation in non EDP countries dropped 
below 13 % and is expected to decrease in the future. The share of indirect tax revenues in 
GDP of EUR-15 countries lies between EDP and non EDP countries. 
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A similar chart 6 shows that NMSs differ significantly from EUR-15 countries in that 
they rely less on direct tax revenue. While 
EUR-15 countries raise approximately the 
same amount from indirect and direct taxes of 
about 13 % of GDP, EDP as well as non EDP 
countries collect through direct taxes less 
than 9 % of GDP, with slightly decreasing 
trend the over last years. Also, there seems to 
be no important difference between EDP and 
non EDP countries with respect to share of 
GDP raised through direct taxes.
6 
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Social security contributions – a personal income tax in disguise – collect more than 
10 % GDP in NMSs and more than 14 % of 
GDP in EUR-15. Although considerably 
higher in the second half of 1990s in EDP 
countries as compared to non EDP countries, 
social security contributions declined and 
currently approximate the share in non EDP 
countries. The contributions, in fact 
earmarked taxes, are usually collected from 
labour income and are supposed to finance 
the social security programs, mainly pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) pension systems. It is, thus, politically sensitive that the share of social 
security contributions have fallen in the EDP countries from 14 % of GDP in 1995 to about 
11 % of GDP now. 
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Source: European Commission (2004b) 
                                                 
6 Government revenues from direct taxes in NMSs have been stable during period since 1995 through 
2004 despite the fact, that effective top statutory tax rate on corporate income has declined from average 30,6 % 
in 1995 to average of 21,5 % in 2004 (see European Commission (2004c) for details). 
- 7 - Structure of expenditures 
It is a well established fact that what really matters for a successful fiscal consolidation 
is the extent it is able to rein into expenditures of the budget – see Alesina and Perotti (1997) 
or Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001). In this part we, thus, analyse in more details the 
expenditure structure of the NMS budgets. However, the data on expenditures are least 
satisfactory on the expenditure side of a budget. Data on many expenditure items (social 
security, defence, etc.) are not readily available, so we use the data based on ESA95 
methodology collected by the European Commission. Brief description of ESA95 expenditure 
categories is thus needed. 
In what follows, we use basic ESA95 expenditure categories, which are compensation 
of employees; collective consumption; social transfers in kind; social transfers other than in 
kind; interest; subsidies; and gross fixed capital formation.
7 
Compensation of employees is self-explanatory category. Collective consumption is 
defined as expenditure on those services, which are intended simultaneously for all members 
of the society, i.e. in more economic terms, it is the expenditure on provision of public goods. 
Social transfers in kind cover those expenditures through which government purchases and 
provides certain goods for some members of the society, while social transfers other than in 
kind cover those expenditures through which government grants certain aid to its members in 
cash. Again, in more economic terms, both types of social transfers can be regarded as 
redistribution expenditures. Interest are expenditures government pays to cover the costs of 
public borrowing and subsidies are government unrequited payments, mainly to producers. 
Note that collective consumption, both categories of social transfers, subsidies, interest 
as well as minor “other” category sum up to total current expenditure category we also use. 
Last ESA95 category is gross fixed capital formation or in more economic terms government 
investment, which with total current expenditure adds up to almost 100 % of the budget 
expenditure with rest formed by “other” items. 
Looking at the shares of GDP of various expenditure items in NMSs and EUR-15 first 
reveals certain differences between the groups of countries and also offers few hints about 
origins of current budgetary problems of EDP countries. 
 
                                                 
7  While the data from the GFS would be more appropriate here, they are published only randomly and could not 
be used for our purposes. 
- 8 - Chart 8a reveals fast growth of public employees’ compensation in EDP countries 
which rose by more than two percent of GDP 
over last years. On the other hand, non EDP 
countries managed to decrease share of this 
expenditure category by 1 % of GDP over the 
same period. Chart also reveals that current 
consolidation efforts of EDP countries will 
most probably be on the expense of public 
employees in those countries. 
Similar story can be found when 
looking at chart 8b denoting share of public 
goods expenditure in GDP. Although 
relatively higher in EDP and non EDP 
countries as compared to EUR-15, non EDP 
countries managed to decrease public goods 
expenditure by more than 2 % of GDP over 
the same period when this expenditure 
budget category rose in EDP countries. 
There seems to be no considerable 
difference between EDP and non EDP 
countries in their expenditure on social 
transfers outlined in chart 8c, nevertheless, 
what has to be noted is a low share of GDP 
devoted to this budget category as compared 
to EUR-15 countries. Also of importance 
might be the fact that social transfers of both 
kinds alone form approximately the same 
share of GDP in NMSs as previously 
described two expenditure categories. 
Expenditures on subsidies denoted by 
chart 8d present relatively small part of GDP 
in EDP and non EDP countries, as well as in 
EUR-15 countries. Notable is also continuous 
decrease of this expenditure category in EDP 
countries which suggests that at least part of 
budget deficit problems of those countries in past might have been due to high tendency to 
financially assist companies. From the different perspective, decrease of expenditure on 
subsidies might reflect slow phasing out of transformation related costs. 
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- 9 - Last chart 8e denotes expenditure on public investment projects. It is not surprising to 
find out higher share of investment 
expenditure in NMSs in general and in EDP 
countries in particular, since many NMSs 
face substantial demand for infrastructure 
reconstruction and development after 
communist era which has left it in critical 
conditions. 
Stagnation of public investment 
expenditure in EDP countries and increase in 
non EDP countries on the other hand might reflect the fact, that non EDP countries in general 
are less economically developed ones (except Slovenia and Cyprus) when measured by GDP 
per capita terms. 
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Source: European Commission (2004b) 
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS 
In this section, we analyse political aspects of public budgets in the NMS. First, we 
look for the existence of political business cycle. For that purpose, we calculated average real 
growth rate of expenditure items separately for election and non-election years for the period 
between 1999 and 2004.
8 Our hypothesis was that government expenditure would tend to 
grow faster in election than in non-election years. However, the data show no significant 
difference in real growth rates of different expenditure items between election and non-
election years, with our expected logic being reversed in some cases.
9 
Second, we estimate the governments’ freedom to manipulate fiscal policy according 
to their political preferences. For this purpose, division of budget into those expenditures 
which can be readily influenced and those outside the direct influence is made. Following the 
example of Hagen and Harden (1992)
10, we defined so called open-ended expenditure as the 
sum of public employees’ remuneration, social transfers other than social transfers in kind 
(social transfers in cash) and interest. Interest payments are clearly beyond direct influence of 
government barring a government default. Government employees’ remuneration are beyond 
the governments’ discretion due to bargaining power of the public administration employees. 
Last, social transfers are extremely difficult to cut as it requires legal changes that tend to be 
lengthy and associated with considerable political costs. 
Note that open-endness is more political than economic category. However, the higher 
the open ended expenditures share either to GDP or to total government expenditure, the more 
difficult expenditure cuts become. High share of open-ended expenditure also indicates higher 
probability of expenditure over-runs in case of adverse economic developments. 
                                                 
8 In order to capture the fact that policy-makers would probably tend to please their voters with higher 
public expenditure before the elections, we defined election year as the year immediately preceding the elections 
if elections took place in the first half of the relevant year and as the year when elections actually took place 
when they were held in the second half of the year. 
9 The detail results are available upon request, but we do not include them in the paper. 
10 Hagen and Harden (1992) found statistically significant and positive correlation between share of 
open-ended expenditure and level of public debt for EUR-15. 
- 10 - Chart 9 presents results of our analysis for EDP, non EDP and EUR-15 countries. 
Looking at the chart 9a, there seems to be no 
difference between EDP and non EDP 
countries in the open ended expenditure share 
in total government budget. Both groups of 
countries spend around 60 % of their budgets 
on pre-determined purposes. Referring to the 
composition of the budget, this is given by the 
fact that higher employees’ remuneration in 
non EDP countries is offset by lower interest 
payments in those countries. However, chart 
9b shows that share of open-ended 
expenditure in GDP is markedly higher in the 
EDP countries as compared to the non EDP 
countries. Moreover, the trend has been 
resolutely upwards since 1998, while the 
share has fallen in the non EDP countries (to 
still massive 24 % of GDP). This suggests 
that cutting government expenditure in the EDP countries requires more effort than in the non 
EDP countries. 
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It is rational, thus, to estimate which factors have been influencing budget deficits in 
NMSs. For that purpose, we run a simple regression whereby we estimated budget deficits 
using economic and political variables.  
Among economic determinants, we included variable measuring output gap in NMSs, 
GAP, building on the idea that budget balance tends to deteriorate with economic growth 
below its potential. Based on the notion that restricted monetary conditions through fixed 
exchange rate or pegged currency discipline policy-makers who then refrain from fiscal 
expansion in order not to disturb external macroeconomic equilibrium
11, we include variable 
measuring external imbalance, EXT. This variable is multiple of current account deficit in 
percent of GDP with dummy variable that takes on value of one if given NMS in given year 
had its exchange rate fixed or pegged to another currency. 
For political economy factors, we built on the literature investigating effect of 
different institutional setup and agents involved in budget preparation, budget approval and 
budget implementation stages on fiscal discipline.
12 In this respect, three different factors are 
usually mentioned. First, power of finance minister (MF) during preparatory budget stage and 
during negotiations about budget in cabinet is usually investigated. Second factor is influence 
                                                 
11 Sun (2004) showed in model based framework, that disciplining effect of fixed exchange rate on 
fiscal policy is dependent on discount factors of policy-makers and for certain values does not necessarily hold. 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) argue that restricted monetary policy is not compatible with irresponsible 
fiscal policy. For empirical investigation with mixed results but with lower budget deficits associated with 
restricted monetary policy, see Fatas and Rose (2001). 
12 Hagen and Harden (1992) found impact of finance minister powers and parliamentary influence on 
fiscal discipline in EUR-15. For recent study of the same issue in EUR-15, see Hallerberg, Strauch and Hagen 
(2001 and 2004). For investigation of this topic in NMSs, see Gleich (2002 and 2003) and Ylaoutainen (2004). 
- 11 - of parliament on final budget and third factor is power of MF during budget implementation 
stage and his supervising authority. We collected indexes describing power of MF during 
preparatory and implementation budget stages as well as index describing influence of 
parliament. All indexes are constructed such that higher value is presumed to imply higher 
fiscal discipline. Because indexes from different studies are applicable to years 2001, 2002 
and 2003 (Gleich (2002), Ylaoutinen (2004) and Gregor (2004)) which is suitable for our 
purposes, we avoided difficulty of their direct comparability by using ranks, rather than 
directly using values of different indexes. 
Our political economy variables are thus power of MF during budget preparatory stage 
and during negotiations in cabinet, FMC, influence of parliament on final shape of budget, 
PAR, power of MF during budget implementation stage, FMI, and dummy which takes on 
value of unity in elections year as defined above. Because our data range from 2001 through 
2003 for each NMS, we arranged them into a panel using random effect model for estimation 
of parameters. Results are given in the table 1. 
Table 1: Determining factors of budget balances in NMSs, 2001-2003 






  -0,24 
(0,43) 
 






**  -0,38 
(0,13) 
*** 
FMC  0,60 
(0,22) 
***     0,57 
(0,20) 
*** 
PAR     0,08
(0,26)
   0,08 
(0,21) 
 
FMI      0,60
(0,23)
**  0,52 
(0,20) 
*** 






  0,72 
(1,12) 
 











  0,42   0,25   0,41   0,56  
Note: Estimates for NMS (excluding Malta and Cyprus) for 2001 through 2003. Dependent variable 
general government deficit (surplus with “+” sign). GAP is deference between actual and potential 
output. EXT is current account deficit to GDP ratio times dummy which takes on value of unity if 
country has restricted monetary policy (fixed exchange rate). FMC is index of MF power during 
cabinet negotiations (higher values imply stronger MF) and FMI is index of MF power during 
implementation of the budget. PAR is index capturing parliamentary influence. Sources of indexes for 
different years are Gleich (2002), Ylaoutinen (2004) and Gregor (2004) and rank classification has 
been used to avoid problem of direct incomparability. EL is dummy taking on value of unity in elections 
years (definition used in the text). Economic data from AMECO database. Random effect panel data 
estimation (unambiguously implied by Hausman statistics on all levels of significance). Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
Estimated coefficient for output gap is insignificant in all specifications and even has a 
wrong sign as budget surplus should be increasing function of output gap. This finding in fact 
suggests that governments in NMSs are not able to stabilize economic cycle in their countries. 
Opposite holds for the estimated coefficient capturing effect of external factors with 
conjunction to fixed or restricted exchange rate. Coefficients are negative and significant in 
all specifications, suggesting that worsening current account balance has non-negligible 
disciplining effect of fiscal policy. 
As for estimated coefficients for political economy variables, power of MF seems 
important to fiscal discipline as budget position improves with rising power of MF. Also little 
change of estimated coefficients and increase of explanatory power of the model after the 
- 12 - inclusion of both variables measuring MF powers suggest that MF power during cabinet 
negotiations and MF power during budget implementation are complements to fiscal 
discipline, rather than substitutes. 
On the other hand, our other two political economy variables capturing parliamentary 
influence and presence of elections are insignificant in all specifications. This finding shows 
that parliaments in NMSs do not have significant influence on final budget and therefore on 
its deficit and, besides not being able to use fiscal policy for economic stabilization, policy-
makers in NMSs are not able to use fiscal policy for electoral purposes or do so in a way that 
does not show in the budget deficit data. 
To sum up this section, EDP countries are those with significantly higher government 
involvement in the economy as measured by the share of revenues and expenditures to GDP. 
While internal composition of revenue side of the budget does not differ between EDP and 
non EDP countries, NMSs rely more heavily on indirect taxation when compared to EUR-15. 
Shifting attention to expenditure side of the budget revealed higher share of budgets in non 
EDP countries devoted to employees’ remuneration, social transfers in kind and lower share 
spent on interest payments. 
The EDP countries have aggravated their budget woes by allowing a faster growth of 
employees’ remuneration and both types of social transfers in the past. This higher growth 
rates have reversed lately, reflecting effort of the EDP countries to cut budget deficits. 
However, authorities in the EDP countries had waited until the very last moment before any 
action in this respect and then applying sudden stop strategy. The non EDP countries could 
afford a more gradual reduction in expenditures growth rates. Data also reveal that while 
major part of consolidation effort in EDP countries falls on employees’ remunerations and 
social transfers of both kinds, the EDP countries have also reined in their investment 
expenditures, limiting long-term growth prospects in order to comply with European fiscal 
rules. 
Although no significant proof of electoral cycle can be found in the data, high share of 
open-ended expenditure to GDP in EDP countries suggests that any consolidation effort in 
those countries would be more demanding and associated with higher political costs. Also, 
high share of open-ended expenditure to GDP in the EDP countries renders budgets in those 
countries more exposed to unexpected events and would thus be associated with rapid budget 
deterioration if an unexpected negative shock occurs.
13 
Therefore, current problems of EDP countries with SGP seem to be given by the mix 
of their larger governments’ involvement in the economy, by higher rigidity of their budgets, 
and by the fact that policy-makers in those countries has recently allowed for escalation of 
politically sensitive expenditure items. 
                                                 
13 Another stylized fact about public sectors in NMSs is low effectiveness of automatic stabilizers, 
confirmed for example by findings of Orban and Szapary (2004). Based on their estimates (excluding Cyprus 
and Malta for which estimates are not available), average budget elasticity with respect to real GDP growth is 
0,433 for EDP countries and 0,380 for non EDP countries with difference significant on 12 % confidence level 
and both averages lower than EUR-15 average of 0,500. 
- 13 - V. GROWTH ACCOUNTING – WHERE HAVE THE CONSOLIDATIONS COME FROM? 
In this section we apply growth accounting technique proposed by Hagen, Hallett and 
Strauch (2001) and used by Hallett, Lewis and Hagen (2004) in order to disentangle the effect 
of growth of economy and effect of fiscal policy effort on the changes in government budget 
deficit in NMSs in the period 2001 through 2004. It has to be noted that this technique does 
rely neither on estimates of elasticity of budget with respect to GDP growth nor on estimates 
of cyclically adjusted budget balance. That is, in what follows, we do not attempt to estimate 
cyclically adjusted budget balance in NMSs.
14 
The Hagen, Hallett and Strauch method estimates what proportion of the change in the 
budget balance is caused by growth of the economy; what proportion is caused by a change in 
monetary policy conditions; what proportion is due to a change in the level of public debt; 
and, finally, what proportion can be described as net fiscal effort which is supposed to capture 
restrictiveness or expansiveness of fiscal policy in given country and given year. If we 
combine the net fiscal effort with information about cyclical position of economy from 
AMECO database, it is possible to estimate whether given fiscal policy is pro-cyclical or anti-
cyclical. 
The growth accounting method is simple; we define government budget deficit in 
percentage of GDP as  
     () t g Y T G d − = − = /        ( 1 )  
where   denotes total government expenditure, T  total government (tax) revenues and Y  
national output (GDP). Thus 
G
g  and t is government expenditure and revenue expressed in 
percentage of GDP terms. From (1) it follows that change in government deficit to GDP ratio 
is given by   














2    (2) 
where γ& denotes rate of growth of GDP. 
Growth effects 
As we want to estimate expansion (or restrictive) effects of fiscal policy we need to 
define neutral fiscal policy. Following Hagen, Hallett and Strauch we use three different 
definitions. The first definition of neutral fiscal policy is the one in which the average tax rate, 
, defined as   as well as the level of public expenditure, G , is held constant. This 
implies that   and 
t Y T t / =
0 = ∆G Y t T ∆ = ∆  which after substitution into (2) realizing that 
expenditures equal taxes plus deficit,  d t g + = , gives   
     ( ) d t d + ⋅ − = ∆ γ&        ( 3 ) .  
The second definition of neutral fiscal policy is based on idea that government allows 
its expenditures to grow in line with increase in revenues but no more. This logic implies that 
                                                 
14 Although all NMSs present estimates of cyclically adjusted budget balance in their CoPrs and many 
of them in PEPs, those estimates are inappropriate for our purpose for two reasons. First, they are not based on 
unified methodology. Second, they in many instances do not cover whole pre-accession period of 2001 through 
2004. Growth accounting allows us to overcome those two complications. 
- 14 - G T ∆ = ∆  which after substitution into (2) gives   
     d d ⋅ − = ∆ γ&         ( 4 ) .  
The final definition of neutral fiscal policy allows government expenditure to grow by 
the rate of growth of potential output but no faster and requires average tax rate to remain 
constant. In this case,  γ g G = ∆  where γ  denotes growth of potential output and combined 
with   after substitution into (2) gives   
    
Y t T ∆ = ∆
()( γ γ γ )
γ & & − ⋅ = − −
∆ −
= ∆ g t g
Y
Y t g
d    (5). 
Equations (3) and (4) imply that government budget deficit should not change if there 
is no economic growth  ) 0 ( = γ&  in order to keep neutral fiscal policy. If there is positive 
economic growth,  ) 0 ( > γ& , government budget deficit should be reduced be rate implied by 
the equations. 
Equation (5) implies that government budget deficit should not change if the actual 
rate of growth equals rate of growth of potential output. If growth of potential output exceeds 
that of actual output, government budget deficit should increase in order for fiscal policy to be 
neutral. 
An alternative interpretation of equations (3) through (5) is that whatever the observed 
reduction of government budget deficit, part of this reduction came from growth of the 
economy, irrespective of fiscal policy efforts. 
Note also, that the three definitions are not equally restrictive with respect to fiscal 
policy. First definition, which requires the government expenditure to remain constant in 
nominal terms, is the most restrictive one. On the other hand, the second definition that allows 
government to increase its expenditure by the amount of extra revenues, is the least restrictive 
one because neutral fiscal policy can be associated with increasing government expenditure. 
Third definition can be regarded as a compromise and we will refer to it in the following text. 
Monetary effects 
Growth accounting also allows for detection of the effect of change of monetary 
conditions and of the effect of change in level of public debt. Let  ( Y B r x / ) ⋅ =  be the ratio of 
interest payments to GDP, where r  is the average interest rate applicable to government debt, 
B  is the volume of government debt and therefore b is government debt to GDP ratio. 
Assuming   is small, its change can be approximated by   
    
x
() ( ) b r b r x ∆ + ∆ = ∆        ( 6 )  
where   reflects a change in interest payments on government debt generated by a 
change in interest rate and   reflects a change in interest payments due to the reduction 
of the stock of debt. 
() b r ∆
( b r ∆ )
Combining effects on government budget deficit coming from economic growth given 
by equation (5) with change in interest payments given by equation (6) approximates change 
in government budget deficit which is due solely to change in economic conditions. 
Alternatively, taking observed reduction of government budget deficit and subtracting the 
effect of change in economic conditions reveals that part of reduction coming from net fiscal 
- 15 - effort, which subsequently allows for judgment about restrictiveness or expansiveness of 
fiscal policy. 
Result of application of growth accounting technique on fiscal policy in NMSs in 
years 2001-2004 are given in tables 2a-2d. When discussing results, we concentrate on values 
exceeding unity since lower values are too low to interpret using the growth accounting 
method. The exception is the stabilization function of fiscal policy where we are concerned 
with sign of net fiscal effort and of output gap. Also, we primarily use the third definition of 
neutrality, denoted as “Due to economic growth III”. 
Note that net fiscal effort with positive sign implies expansionary fiscal policy. Also, 
positive output gap denotes economy above its potential. Therefore, positive sign for net 
fiscal effort combined with positive sign for output gap mean that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical. 
Exactly the same logic implies for case when net fiscal effort and output gap are negative, 
denoting a situation of restrictive fiscal policy and economy below its potential. Thus, in order 
for fiscal policy to be anti-cyclical, net fiscal effort and output gap should have inverse signs. 
Table 2a: Growth Accounting, % of GDP, data for 2001 
  CY CZ
 * EE  LV  LT HU
 * MT
 * PL
 * SI SK
 * 
Observed reduction  -0,10 2,30 -0,80 -0,70 -0,50 1,40 0,20 3,10 -0,70 -6,30
Due to economic growth III  -0,12 -0,45 -0,37 -0,58 -0,70 0,10  2,32  1,05  0,53 -0,67
Impact of monetary policy  -0,06 0,18 0,00 -0,07 -0,18 -0,43 -0,37 0,99 -0,22 -0,39
Impact of change in debt  0,16 0,45 -0,02 0,16 -0,06 -0,19 0,37 -0,01 0,07 -0,10
Due to economic growth I  -1,56 -1,23 -2,32 -3,09 -2,29 -1,88 0,98 -0,45 -1,24 -2,02
Due to economic growth II  -0,10 -0,15 0,02 -0,17 -0,13 -0,17 0,14 -0,04 -0,08 -0,23
Net fiscal policy effort  -0,08 2,12 -0,41 -0,21 0,45 1,92 -2,12 1,07 -1,07 -5,14
Output Gap  1,80 -0,90 0,20 0,10 -2,80 0,40 -0,60 -2,20 0,00 -0,90
Note: Negative observed reduction of government budget deficit denotes improvement of budget deficit. Change due to economic growth 
III is given by equation (5) and impact of monetary policy and impact of change in debt by equation (6). Change due to economic growth I 
and II are illustrative only. Net fiscal effort based on third definition of neutral fiscal policy and given as observed reduction less sum of 
effect of growth, monetary policy and change in debt. Positive net fiscal effort denotes expansionary fiscal policy. Output gap defined as 
actual less potential output with negative values denoting recessions. Values of equal signs in last two rows denote pro-cyclical policy.
 * denotes countries that did not comply with SGP 3 % of GDP limit for budget deficit in given year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission (2004b) and AMECO data 
Table reveals the fact that in year 2001, fiscal policy in Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland was strongly expansionary (net fiscal effort was higher than 1, indicating strong 
relaxation of fiscal policy). In case of Czech Republic and Poland the relaxation of fiscal 
policy was anti-cyclical and in case of Hungary the relaxation of fiscal policy was even pro-
cyclical as Hungary had positive output gap (was above its potential). On the other hand, 
fiscal policy in Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia was strongly restrictive despite negative output 
gap in Malta and Slovakia and neutral economic position in Slovenia. 
Should we accept also lower values of net fiscal effort and combine them with output 
gap, we find that three out of ten NMSs (Hungary, Malta and Slovakia) experienced pro-
cyclical fiscal policy (Hungary expansionary and Malta and Slovakia restrictive). 
Note also that results for different definitions of neutral fiscal policy correspond to 
their different restrictiveness. First and most restrictive definition in every case always require 
larger reduction of government budget deficit than second and least restrictive definition. 
- 16 - Table 2b: Growth Accounting, % of GDP, data for 2002 
  CY
 * CZ
 * EE  LV  LT HU
 * MT
 * PL
 * SI SK
 * 
Observed reduction  2,20 0,80 -1,20 0,60 -0,50 4,90 -0,60 -0,20 -0,40 -0,30
Due to economic growth III  0,84 0,28 -0,37 0,14 -0,45 0,21 -0,41 0,63 0,14 -0,46
Impact of monetary policy  -0,54 -0,06 0,04 -0,31 -0,16 -0,63 -0,12 -0,21 -0,18 -0,30
Impact of change in debt  0,16 0,22 0,06 -0,05  -0,03 0,32 0,02 0,36 0,13 -0,43
Due to economic growth I  -0,80 -0,74 -2,57 -2,40 -2,31 -1,88 -0,84 -0,61 -1,52 -2,42
Due to economic growth II  -0,09 -0,10 0,10 -0,17 -0,10 -0,32 -0,10 -0,05 -0,08 -0,26
Net fiscal policy effort  1,74 0,36 -0,94 0,82 0,14 5,00 -0,09 -0,98 -0,50 0,89 
Output Gap  -0,20 -1,50 1,10 -0,20 -1,60 0,00 0,20 -3,40 -0,30 0,00 
Note: Negative observed reduction of government budget deficit denotes improvement of budget deficit. Change due to economic growth 
III is given by equation (5) and impact of monetary policy and impact of change in debt by equation (6). Change due to economic growth I 
and II are illustrative only. Net fiscal effort based on third definition of neutral fiscal policy and given as observed reduction less sum of 
effect of growth, monetary policy and change in debt. Positive net fiscal effort denotes expansionary fiscal policy. Output gap defined as 
actual less potential output with negative values denoting recessions. Values of equal signs in last two rows denote pro-cyclical policy.
 * denotes countries that did not comply with SGP 3 % of GDP limit for budget deficit in given year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission (2004b) and AMECO data 
Results imply that in year 2002, fiscal policy was expansionary in Cyprus and 
(massively) in Hungary with anti-cyclical nature in case of Cyprus and non-neutral position in 
case of Hungary. On the other hand, there are no countries that displayed restrictive fiscal 
policy in 2002, even though Estonia and Poland were very close to the threshold. In the year 
2002 governments were slightly more successful in stabilising their economies: only two out 
of the ten NMS ran a pro-cyclical policy (Poland and Slovenia) although Hungary and 
Slovakia seemed to be a bit too expansionary, given their neutral business cycle position. 
Table 2c shows results of the growth accounting methodology for last pre-accession 
year, 2003. Given their high deficits and the imminent SGP application, one would expect 
strong consolidation efforts or at least strongly restrictive fiscal policy in most NMS 
countries. However, only Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia showed a restrictive fiscal policy 
effort, while Czech Republic, Lithuania and Malta merrily run an expansionary policy.
15 
Lithuania was even running pro-cyclical fiscal policy, with a positive output gap. Hungary 
reversed its 2002 policy and tightened fiscal policy significantly, although the economy was 
below potential. Four out of ten countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia) run pro-
cyclical policies in 2003 (restrictive in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia and expansive in 
Lithuania). 
                                                 
15 Very high increase of budget deficit in Czech Republic is given partly by change in methodological 
treatment in government guarantees which show as one-off measure in Czech Republic statistics. However, 
without one-off measures, observed reduction in Czech Republic would be equal to -1,20 implying net fiscal 
effort of -0,99. 
- 17 - Table 2c: Growth Accounting, % of GDP, data for 2003 
  CY
 * CZ
 * EE  LV  LT HU
 * MT
 * PL
 * SI SK
 * 
Observed reduction  1,80 5,90 -1,60 -1,20 0,40 -3,00 3,80 0,30 -0,40 -2,00
Due to economic growth III  0,60 -0,16 0,50 -0,29 -1,19 0,35 0,59 -0,52 0,53 -0,04
Impact of monetary policy  0,28 -0,49 -0,08 0,06 -0,06 -0,35 -0,07 -0,14 -0,44 -0,68
Impact of change in debt  0,20 0,44 0,00 0,02 -0,06 0,15 0,51 0,34 -0,01  -0,04
Due to economic growth I  -0,88 -1,76 -1,75 -2,79 -3,28 -1,53 -0,10 -1,66 -1,16 -1,64
Due to economic growth II  -0,13 -0,39 0,16 -0,11 -0,18 -0,19 -0,02 -0,15 -0,05 -0,15
Net fiscal policy effort  0,72 6,11 -2,02 -0,99 1,72 -3,15 2,77 0,62 -0,48 -1,23
Output Gap  -1,40 -1,10 -0,20 0,40  1,70 -0,70 -1,00 -2,50 -1,40 0,10 
Note: Negative observed reduction of government budget deficit denotes improvement of budget deficit. Change due to economic growth 
III is given by equation (5) and impact of monetary policy and impact of change in debt by equation (6). Change due to economic growth I 
and II are illustrative only. Net fiscal effort based on third definition of neutral fiscal policy and given as observed reduction less sum of 
effect of growth, monetary policy and change in debt. Positive net fiscal effort denotes expansionary fiscal policy. Output gap defined as 
actual less potential output with negative values denoting recessions. Values of equal signs in last two rows denote pro-cyclical policy.
 * denotes countries that did not comply with SGP 3 % of GDP limit for budget deficit in given year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission (2004b) and AMECO data 
Table 2d shows data for the year of EU accession for the ten NMSs. Surely, they 
would show net fiscal effort to assure old members, EUR-15, that the enlarged EU will be 
fiscally manageable. 
However, table 2d does not suggest any considerable consolidation effort.
16 Only 
Malta displays net fiscal effort that confirms the hypothesis of strong consolidation. Cyprus 
observed reduction in the budget deficit, but benefited from economic growth and 
improvement in monetary policy and thus displays rather neutral fiscal policy. Czech 
Republic, although experiencing reduction in budget deficit, owes this improvement to 
economic growth and change in monetary policy conditions with net fiscal effort showing 
neutral fiscal policy. Observed reduction of budget deficit in Hungary is on the other hand 
given by fiscal effort but is not considerable enough to classify for restrictive fiscal policy. 
Observed budget stance in Poland in fact deteriorated in 2004 and can be classified as 
strongly expansionary. Slovakia can be classified as neutral with respect to both observed and 
net fiscal policy stance. 
Table 2d: Growth Accounting, % of GDP, data for 2004 
  CY
 * CZ






Observed reduction  -1,20  -7,80 2,50 0,50 0,70 -0,70 -4,50 1,70 0,30 0,20 
Due to economic growth III  -0,14 -0,23 0,23 -0,11 -0,14 -0,05 0,42 -1,13 -0,24 -0,23
Impact of monetary policy  -0,36 -0,53 0,01  0,01 -0,04 0,06 -0,43 -0,14 -0,09 -0,22
Impact of change in debt  0,09 0,00 -0,03 0,01 -0,02 0,05 0,11 0,17 0,11 0,09 
Due to economic growth I  -1,53 -1,85 -2,43 -2,72 -2,47 -1,91 -0,47 -2,64 -1,83 -1,89
Due to economic growth II  -0,18 -0,18 0,03 -0,15 -0,18 -0,21 -0,05 -0,32 -0,09 -0,19
Net fiscal policy effort  -0,79  -7,04 2,28 0,58 0,90 -0,76 -4,60 2,80 0,52 0,56 
Output Gap  -1,10 -0,60 -0,70 0,70  2,10 -0,60 -1,80 -0,40 -0,90 0,70 
Note: Negative observed reduction of government budget deficit denotes improvement of budget deficit. Change due to economic growth 
III is given by equation (5) and impact of monetary policy and impact of change in debt by equation (6). Change due to economic growth I 
and II are illustrative only. Net fiscal effort based on third definition of neutral fiscal policy and given as observed reduction less sum of 
effect of growth, monetary policy and change in debt. Positive net fiscal effort denotes expansionary fiscal policy. Output gap defined as 
actual less potential output with negative values denoting recessions. Values of equal signs in last two rows denote pro-cyclical policy.
 * denotes countries that did not comply with SGP 3 % of GDP limit for budget deficit in given year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission (2004b) and AMECO data 
                                                 
16 Again, without counting for one-off measures in case of Czech Republic, observed reduction would 
be -0,80 and net fiscal effort -0,04. 
- 18 - While in 2003 most NMSs run counter-cyclical fiscal policy, the year 2004 was almost 
opposite: seven out of the ten run pro-cyclical fiscal policy in 2004. Only Estonia, Poland and 
Slovenia stabilised their respective economies in 2004. 
The weak fiscal performance in 2004 is all the more puzzling, given the exceptionally 
positive external conditions. For five EDP countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia) economic growth contributed to fiscal consolidations. The same holds 
for monetary policy impact (that benefited Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta, Poland and 
Slovakia and only marginally harmed Hungary). Thus, the EDP countries mostly wasted 
beneficial economic conditions in 2004. 
Table 2e: Net Fiscal Efforts, % of GDP, 2001-2004 
  CY
 * CZ






2001  -0,08 2,12 -0,41 -0,21 0,45 1,92 -2,12 1,07 -1,07 -5,14
2002  1,74 0,36 -0,94 0,82 0,14 5,00 -0,09 -0,98 -0,50 0,89 
2003  0,72 6,11 -2,02 -0,99 1,72 -3,15 2,77 0,62 -0,48 -1,23
2004  -0,79  -7,04 2,28 0,58 0,90 -0,76  -4,60 2,80 0,52 0,56 
To summarize this section, we may conclude that NMSs have not been very successful 
in stabilising their economies with fiscal policy and that their stabilisation performance has 
worsened over time. Out of 40 occurrences, in 16 (40 %) governments have run pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy. Seven these events took place in 2004. Also, the fiscal efforts were more or less 
evenly distributed between restrictive and expansionary. In 10 cases net fiscal effort was 
significantly positive (expansionary) and in 8 it was significantly negative (restrictive), 
remaining 22 cases being too close to neutral policy – see Table 2e. 
The EDP and non EDP countries do not differ in frequency of positive and negative 
net fiscal efforts. However, the two groups do differ in variance of these efforts. Among the 
four non EDP countries, none net fiscal effort was above 2 % of GDP and in 12 out of 16 
instances, the net fiscal effort was not significantly different from zero. The EDP countries 
have run more volatile fiscal policies often switching from highly positive net fiscal effort to 
highly negative one. When we exclude specific data for the Czech Republic in 2003 and 
2004, the largest positive fiscal effort took place in Hungary in 2002 (+5 %). The largest 
negative fiscal effort was recorded in Slovakia in 2001 and in Malta in 2004 (-5 %). 
We can thus speculate that high share of government expenditures and their higher 
pre-determination (see charts 9a and 9b) in the EDP countries make their fiscal less 
predictable and more prone to periodic u-turns. This argument is supported by data from 2004 
showing almost no consolidation of fiscal policy in most of the EDP countries regardless 
VI. STRUCTURE OF CONSOLIDATIONS 
Successful and unsuccessful consolidations 
This section builds on proposition of McDermott and Wescott (1996), Alesina and 
Perotti (1997) and of Perotti, Strauch and Hagen (1998) as well as on proposition of current 
public finance literature concerned with periods of fiscal consolidations. The literature has 
converged on the judgment that composition of consolidations matters. In this section, we 
- 19 - look at fiscal data of NMSs spanning from 1995 through 2006 and identify periods of fiscal 
consolidations which we investigate furthering more details. 
In accordance with the literature, we define period of fiscal consolidation as a period 
in which government primary budget deficit to GDP ratio (budget deficit less interest on 
public debt) improved by more than 1 % of GDP in the first year and improved in second and 
later years.
17 Consolidation is said to last, until government primary budget deficit to GDP is 
being reduced. 
We define period of successful consolidation as one in which government primary 
budget deficit to GDP ratio two years after consolidation initiation stands at 75 % or better of 
government primary budget deficit to GDP ratio in the year when consolidation started (or 
changes sign) and does not deteriorate in those two years. Unsuccessful consolidations are 
those which do not fulfil our condition. 
Now, let   be the ratio of budget item to GDP in the year when a consolidation 
ended and   be the ratio of budget item to GDP in the year before a consolidation started. 
Then the difference   shows by how much the budget item 
e X
1 − s X
( 1 − − s e X X ) X  changed relative to 
GDP throughout the consolidation period. 
The literature shows that the more a consolidation is based on expenditure reduction 
and less it is based on revenue increase, the higher is the probability that a consolidation will 
bring lasting improvement in budget position – see Alesina and Perotti (1997). 
Results for NMSs are given in the table 3. Note that positive values for government 
revenue budget items denote increase in the relevant revenue item to GDP ratio throughout a 
consolidation and negative values for government expenditure budget items denote decrease 
in relevant expenditure item to GDP ratio throughout a consolidation. 
Looking at consolidations that took place before the EU accession, it is apparent that 
on average, those consolidations has been based on government expenditure reduction and 
were also associated with slight government revenue decrease. Expenditure budget items that 
show largest decrease through the consolidations are public goods as well as redistribution 
expenditures. On the other hand, subsidies and expenditure for public investment were not 
typically reduced during the consolidation periods. The fact that investment did not fall during 
consolidations is rather surprising and counters arguments that governments in fiscal crisis 
find it easiest to cut or postpone investment – see below. 
 
                                                 
17 We do not use definition of fiscal consolidation of Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) because it is too 
restrictive and thus we would be able to identify only very few periods of fiscal consolidation in our data sample. 
Also, we do not use cyclically adjusted budget data because those are not readily available. 
- 20 - Table 3: Summary of consolidations in the NMSs 
  Primary 
























CYI                          -2,6 -2,1 3,8 1,7 4,0 1,6 -0,1 -0,3 0,0 0,4 0,7 0,5 181% / -81%  2000-2001  B(E) 
CYII                          -4,0 -4,0 1,7 -2,2 1,9 -2,2 -1,0 -2,8 -0,9 0,2 -0,6 0,3 42% / 58%  2004-2006  na 
CZI                    -11,1  -11,0  -1,0 -12,0 -0,3 0,8 -0,1 0,2 0,1 1,0 -0,1 -1,1  -9% / 109%  1996-1997  B(E) 
CZII                            -8,4 -8,3 -0,4 -8,7 -0,8 -2,6 -0,9 -0,2 -0,8 -1,0 -0,4 0,2 -5% / 105%  2004-2006 na 
EE                          -6,7 -6,8 0,1 -6,8 -1,1 -4,7 -2,0 -1,6 -1,3 -1,0 -0,2 -0,8 1% / 99%  2000-2003  E 
LV I                               -3,3 -3,5 1,0 -2,5 -0,7 -3,6 -0,6 -0,6 -3,0 0,0 -0,2 0,3 29% / 71%  1996-1997 E 
LV II                               -3,0 -2,8 -3,0 -5,8 -3,9 -6,3 -1,3 -1,1 -0,8 -3,8 -0,7 -0,4 -107% / 207%  2000-2001 R 
LT                          -4,0 -4,1 -4,5 -8,6 -4,8 -5,7 -1,0 -2,1 -1,9 -2,1 -0,3 0,2 -110% / 210%  2000-2002  R 
HU                            -4,0 -3,7 -0,1 -3,9 -0,9 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 0,3 0,4 -0,5 -1,9 -3% / 103%  2003-2004 R 
MT                            -6,3 -6,3 6,1 -0,2 0,7 -2,3 -0,2 : -0,4 -0,5 -0,8 -0,3 97% / 3% 2004-2006  na 
PL                            -2,5 -2,5 -0,4 -3,0 -0,8 -3,1 -0,5 -0,8 -0,4 -1,0 -0,1 0,4 -16% / 116%  2005-2006 na 
Average 
All                          5,08 5,01 0,30 -4,73 -0,61 -2,58  -0,74 -0,97 -0,83 -0,67 -0,29 -0,24 9% / 91%
Successful                            5,25 5,30 0,85 -4,45 -0,82 -3,73 -1,05 -2,17 -1,13 -0,85 -0,48 -0,15 8% / 92%
Unsuccessful                            4,99 4,84 -0,01 -4,89 -0,49 -1,93 -0,56 -0,46 -0,66 -0,57 -0,19 -0,29 10% / 90%
Difference                          0,26 0,46 0,86 0,44 -0,34 -1,80 -0,49 -1,71 
*** -0,47 -0,28 -0,29 0,14  
All 
Average 
All                        4,96 4,86 -0,53 -5,41 -1,10 -2,60  -0,79 -0,84 -0,94 -0,73 -0,19 -0,46 -3% / 103%
Successful                          5,35 5,45 -2,20 -7,70 -2,95 -5,20 -1,50 -1,85 -1,60 -1,55 -0,25 -0,30 -54% / 154%
Unsuccessful                            4,80 4,62 0,14 -4,50 -0,36 -1,56 -0,50 -0,44 -0,68 -0,40 -0,16 -0,52 18% / 82%
Difference                              0,55 0,83 -2,34 -3,20 -2,59 -3,64
** -1,00
* -1,41 
*** -0,92 -1,15 -0,09 0,22  
Excluding  
2004 - 2006 
consolidations 
Average 
All                          5,30 5,28 1,75 -3,53 0,25 -2,55  -0,65 -1,27 -0,63 -0,58 -0,48 0,15 30% / 70%
Difference 
from pre 2004 
consolidations 
0,34                        0,42 2,28 1,89 1,35 0,05 0,14 -0,42 0,32 0,15 -0,29 0,61  
2004 - 2006 
consolidations only 
Note: Positive values for government budget revenue items denote growth of those items to GDP ratios during the period of consolidation. Negative values for government budget expenditure items denote fall of those items to GDP 
ratios during the period of consolidation. Consolidation periods on grey background are classified as successful. Fiscal flow ending the consolidation with R implies end of consolidation due to revenue fall and with E implies end of 
consolidation due to expenditure increase (B(X) for both with X prevailing). *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European Commission (2004b) data 
 
 
- 21 - Interesting differences arise between periods of successful and unsuccessful 
consolidations. Successful consolidations we were able to identify were associated with 
considerable government expenditure reduction and took place despite the drop in 
government revenues. As a result of large decrease of expenditure, those countries that 
managed to bring about successful consolidation experienced reduction in both ordinary and 
primary budget deficit exceeding the reduction in the case of unsuccessful consolidations. 
Contrary to successful consolidations, the unsuccessful ones has relied less on 
government expenditure reduction and were associated with slight revenue increases. 
Unsuccessful consolidation too resulted in reduction of ordinary and primary budget deficit, 
however on a smaller scale. 
Table 3 also reveals the fact that successful consolidations are associated with more 
pronounced reduction in government expenditure for provision of public good and 
redistribution, i.e. are based on reduction of those expenditure items that are more politically 
costly to reduce. Our findings thus support the idea that consolidations based on expenditure 
reduction as opposed to revenue increases and consolidations based on tackling politically 
sensitive expenditure items are those that lead to lasting deficit reduction. Although our 
results do not seem overwhelmingly statistically significant, they point to the direction found 
by Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) for fiscal adjustment periods in OECD countries in 
1960 through 1990 period. 
Where our findings differ from findings of Hagen, Hallett and Strauch (2001) is that 
they found higher reduction in expenditure for public investment during periods of successful 
consolidations while our data show that less pronounced reduction of this budget item has 
been associated with successful consolidations in NMSs. 
Interesting differences also arise when comparing pre and post EU accession periods 
of fiscal adjustments. As opposed to pre-EU accession consolidations, post-EU accession 
consolidations rely more on revenue increases and less on expenditure reductions, despite the 
fact that post-EU accession consolidations on average aim for more distinct reduction of 
ordinary and primary budget deficits. Although in general not statistically significant, 
expenditure items that has been reduced more during pre-EU accession consolidations are 
collective consumption, social transfers of both kinds and expenditure for public investment. 
On the other hand, it can be expected that post-EU accession consolidation will be marked by 
considerable reduction in public employees’ wage bill and with reduction in subsidies, which 
in case of employees’ remuneration corroborates our earlier findings about considerable drop 
of growth of this budget item in EDP countries. 
On the whole, it can be said that post-EU accession consolidations induced, among 
other factors, by non-compliance with the SGP tend to rely on measures, which have been 
associated with unsuccessful rather than successful consolidations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As a summary, during the description of fiscal policy in NMSs, we have seen that a lot 
has been accomplished. Many NMSs implemented important reforms over the past years, 
from longer perspective, probably most important being pension systems reforms. But also 
- 22 - many important steps remain to be done. Apart from rather slow progress in health care 
system reforms in many countries, there seems to be a need to reduce generosity of social 
benefit systems that repeatedly put a strong pressure on public finance in many NMSs and 
have been a source of unexpected budgetary developments. Many reforms also display low 
quality of implementation burdened, above all, by political disputes. 
Our analysis confirms that fiscal policy may and does differ within the NMSs. We 
have identified two groups of countries where one is characterised by a lower share of 
government and, also, by a low budget deficits. The other group has a higher government 
share in the economy and runs haphazard fiscal policy characterised by high and persistent 
fiscal deficits. As it happens, the low government and low deficit group has also experienced 
higher economic growth, confirming that high government expenditures financed with high 
deficits do not provide for a sustainable economic growth. 
Measures implemented just before or after EDP initiation show clear focus on bringing 
budget deficits under control, however seem to rely on steps that might be hard to sustain 
politically as well as on steps that are possible to implement quickly, missing long-term 
perspective of coherent and comprehensive reforms. 
With regard to the political economy issues, more concretely power of MFs in NMSs 
played key role in determining budget deficit behaviour prior to EU accession. Only 
economic variable we found to be important for budget deficits in NMSs is effect of restricted 
exchange rate combined with increasing external imbalance. 
Last, and most speculatively, we try to extrapolate experience of “old EU members”, 
i.e. EUR-15 as their fiscal policy in the run up to the EMU membership is concerned. The 
prized EMU membership had inspired EUR-15 governments to eliminate their deficits and 
even run an aggregate fiscal surplus, the first and perhaps the last, of 1 % of GDP in year 
2000. However, once within the club, EUR-15 has loosened their policies again.
18 The 
aggregate government deficit of the twelve eurozone members reached 2,8 % of GDP in 2003 
and 2,7 % in 2004. Hallett, Lewis and Hagen (2004) maintain that current fiscal problems of 
several EUR-15 countries are caused by expansionary fiscal policies during the period of 
benign economic growth of 2000 and 2001. 
The NMS are bound to adopt common European currency sooner or later, so their 
position is similar to the EUR-15 some 8 
years ago and the threat of not being 
allowed to adopt euro might work as a 
disciplining tool. However, it seems that 
the NMS are more resistant to the threat 
than the EUR-15 were. 






- 5 - 4 - 3 - 2 - 10123456
NMSs EUR-15
Note: Time zero denotes two years prior to EMU accession, for EUR-15 
1999 and for NMSs 2006. 
Source: European Commission (2004b); Authors’ calculations 
The chart 10 draws paths of 
average budget deficit of EUR-15 and 
NMSs. Horizontal axis denotes time, 
with time zero being two years prior to 
                                                 
18 Strictly speaking, three of the EUR-15 countries (UK, Sweden and Denmark) are not members of the 
eurozone. However, even their fiscal polices are subject to the SGP surveillance. 
- 23 - the euro adoption as these data are most relevant for the accession decision. In case of EUR-
15, time zero corresponds to year 1999 and in case of NMSs, time zero corresponds to year 
2006.
19 
The chart illustrates our earlier point, i.e. that budget deficits in the EUR-15 have 
widened after the threat of not qualify for euro passed away. The NMSs’ fiscal outlook is 
rather worrying in this context. The NMSs adopted much more relaxed fiscal plans: on 
average, the NMSs expect to run deficit of about 2 % of GDP in 2006. That means that the 
NMS will have much smaller margin for fiscal policy relaxation. Given the NMSs’ problems 
in managing fiscal policy and their inclination to run pro-cyclical fiscal policies, odds are not 
very promising. Moreover, if the NMSs do qualify for the EMU membership, political will to 
keep fiscal deficits under control may fade as it did in the EUR-15 countries and then the 
NMSs may face high deficits again. 
We believe that the two latter effects, i.e. the tendency of postponing structural 
reforms and potential malaise following the expected EMU membership, may make for a 
dangerous brew, especially in the already troubled EDP countries. These six countries 
(perhaps with the exception of Slovakia) demonstrate their failure to put fiscal policy in order 
even at time of exceptionally supportive environment: growth is relatively robust and the 
countries are motivated by cherished EMU membership. Still, they run fiscal deficits 
averaging 4 % of GDP. One may just fear how high these deficits may become in a few years 
time… 
                                                 
19 Although specific year of euro adoption of each NMS is not known yet, we believe year 2008 
approximates closely year when NMSs will adopt common European currency on average. 
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- 25 - APPENDIX 
Table A1: Total revenue; general government 
ESA 1995 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure)) 
                          CY CZ EE LV LT HU MT PL SI SK Average EUR-15 EDP  non  EDP  Difference
1995  :                            41,0 43,9 37,3 34,2 : : 47,4 : 53,3 42,9 46,1 47,2 38,5 8,8  * 
1996  :                            39,7 40,4 37,0 34,3 : : 46,5 : 54,1 42,0 46,7 46,8 37,2 9,5  * 
1997  :                              40,0 40,9 38,3 37,1 : : 45,7 : 58,8 43,5 46,8 48,2 38,8 9,4   
1998  34,3                              38,8 38,9 40,6 37,4 : : 44,5 : 57,1 41,7 46,6 43,7 39,0 4,7   
1999  34,2                              39,2 38,8 37,4 37,3 : : 44,9 : 49,8 40,2 47,0 42,0 37,8 4,2   
2000  36,3                              38,5 37,7 35,1 35,8 44,6 35,6 42,5 44,7 47,6 39,8 46,7 40,9 38,3 2,5   
2001  38,0                              39,1 37,2 34,4 33,0 44,3 37,4 43,8 45,1 45,5 39,8 46,2 41,4 37,4 3,9   
2002  37,3                              40,2 38,0 33,1 32,8 43,4 39,7 43,9 45,7 45,2 39,9 45,5 41,6 37,4 4,2   
2003  39,7                              41,9 38,9 34,5 32,3 43,6 39,8 43,7 46,2 35,4 39,6 45,8 40,7 38,0 2,7   
2004
(e)  40,4                              41,9 39,3 34,0 33,2 43,3 47,3 45,6 45,3 34,4 40,5 45,3 42,2 38,0 4,2   
2005
(f)  41,4                              41,6 39,6 35,3 33,7 42,5 46,7 45,7 44,6 34,3 40,5 45,2 42,0 38,3 3,7   
2006
(f)  41,4                              41,5 39,0 34,8 33,2 42,0 45,9 45,2 44,3 33,7 40,1 45,0 41,6 37,8 3,8   
Source: GENERAL GOVERNMENT DATA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL ECFIN, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, PART II: TABLES BY 
SERIES, AUTUMN 2004. Note: *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
(e) denotes expected and 
(f) forecasted value. 
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Table A2: Total expenditure; general government 
ESA 1995 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure)) 
              CY CZ EE LV LT HU            MT PL SI SK Average EUR-15 EDP  non  EDP  Difference
1995  :                            54,4 43,4 39,3 36,1 : : 51,3 : 54,1 46,4 51,3 53,3 39,6 13,7  *** 
1996  :                              42,8 42,1 37,4 37,9 : : 51,2 : 61,5 45,5 50,9 51,8 39,1 12,7 * 
1997  :                              42,4 39,2 36,8 38,3 : : 50,2 : 65,0 45,3 49,3 52,5 38,1 14,4   
1998  38,6                              43,8 39,3 41,3 40,4 : : 46,6 : 60,8 44,4 48,2 47,5 40,3 7,1   
1999  38,7                              42,9 42,6 42,3 42,9 : : 47,0 : 56,9 44,8 47,7 46,4 42,6 3,8   
2000  38,7                              42,1 38,2 37,9 38,4 47,6 41,9 44,2 48,2 59,9 43,7 45,8 45,7 40,7 5,1   
2001  40,4                              45,0 36,9 36,5 35,0 48,7 43,8 47,7 47,9 51,5 43,3 47,2 46,2 39,1 7,1 * 
2002  41,9                              46,9 36,6 35,8 34,3 52,6 45,5 48,1 48,1 50,9 44,1 47,6 47,7 38,7 9,0 ** 
2003  46,1                              54,5 35,8 36,0 34,1 49,8 49,4 47,6 48,2 39,2 44,1 48,5 47,8 38,5 9,2 ** 
2004
(e)  45,6                              46,7 38,8 36,0 35,7 48,7 52,4 51,3 47,5 38,3 44,1 48,0 47,2 39,5 7,7 ** 
2005
(f)  44,4                              46,3 39,4 38,1 36,2 47,6 50,7 49,9 46,8 38,3 43,8 47,5 46,2 40,1 6,1 ** 
2006
(f)  43,9                              45,8 38,9 37,7 35,1 46,7 49,2 48,3 46,3 37,9 43,0 47,3 45,3 39,5 5,8 * 
Source: GENERAL GOVERNMENT DATA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL ECFIN, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, PART II: TABLES BY 
SERIES, AUTUMN 2004. Note: *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
(e) denotes expected and 
(f) forecasted value. 
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Table A3: Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-); general government 
ESA 1995 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure)) 
              CY CZ EE LV LT HU            MT PL SI SK Average EUR-15 EDP  non  EDP  Difference
1995  :                              -13,4 0,4 -2,0 -1,9 : : -2,3 : -0,9 -3,4 -5,2 -5,5 -1,2 -4,4   
1996  :                            -3,1 -1,7 -0,5 -3,6 : : -3,6 : -7,4 -3,3 -4,2 -4,7 -1,9 -2,8  * 
1997  :                            -2,4 1,7 1,5 -1,2 : : -4,0 : -6,2 -1,8 -2,5 -4,2 0,7 -4,9  *** 
1998  -4,3                            -5,0 -0,3 -0,6 -3,0 : : -2,1 : -3,8 -2,7 -1,7 -3,8 -1,3 -2,5  ** 
1999  -4,5                              -3,6 -3,7 -4,9 -5,6 : : -1,4 : -7,1 -4,4 -0,7 -4,2 -4,7 0,6   
2000  -2,4                              -3,7 -0,6 -2,8 -2,5 -3,0 -6,2 -0,7 -3,5 -12,3 -3,8 1,0 -4,7 -2,4 -2,4   
2001  -2,4                            -5,9 0,3 -2,1 -2,0 -4,4 -6,4 -3,8 -2,8 -6,0 -3,6 -1,1 -4,8 -1,7 -3,2  *** 
2002  -4,6                            -6,8 1,4 -2,7 -1,5 -9,2 -5,8 -3,6 -2,4 -5,7 -4,1 -2,1 -6,0 -1,3 -4,7  *** 
2003  -6,4                            -12,6 3,1 -1,5 -1,9 -6,2 -9,6 -3,9 -2,0 -3,7 -4,5 -2,7 -7,1 -0,6 -6,5  *** 
2004
(e)  -5,2                            -4,8 0,5 -2,0 -2,6 -5,5 -5,1 -5,6 -2,3 -3,9 -3,7 -2,7 -5,0 -1,6 -3,4  *** 
2005
(f)  -3,0                            -4,7 0,2 -2,8 -2,5 -5,2 -4,0 -4,1 -2,2 -4,0 -3,2 -2,4 -4,2 -1,8 -2,3  ** 
2006
(f)  -2,4                            -4,3 0,1 -2,9 -1,9 -4,7 -3,3 -3,1 -1,9 -4,1 -2,9 -2,3 -3,7 -1,7 -2,0  ** 
Source: GENERAL GOVERNMENT DATA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL ECFIN, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, PART II: TABLES BY 
SERIES, AUTUMN 2004. Note: *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
(e) denotes expected and 
(f) forecasted value. 
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Table A4: General government consolidated gross debt 
ESA 1995 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure)) 
              CY CZ EE LV LT HU            MT PL SI SK Average EUR-15 EDP  non  EDP  Difference
1995  :                              : : : : : : : : : : 70,7 : : : : 
1996  :                            13,1 7,5 13,8 : 73,6 40,0 : : 30,3 29,7 72,6 39,3 10,7 28,6  * 
1997  :                            12,7 6,3 11,1 15,8 63,9 48,1 : : 33,0 27,3 71,0 39,4 11,1 28,4  ** 
1998  61,6                            15,0 5,6 9,8 16,8 61,6 53,1 : 23,6 34,0 31,2 68,8 45,1 14,0 31,1  ** 
1999  62,0                            16,0 6,0 12,6 23,0 60,9 56,8 40,1 24,9 47,2 35,0 67,9 47,2 16,6 30,5  *** 
2000  61,6                            18,2 4,7 12,9 23,8 55,4 56,4 36,8 27,4 49,9 34,7 64,1 46,4 17,2 29,2  *** 
2001  64,3                            25,3 4,4 14,9 22,9 53,5 62,0 36,7 28,1 48,7 36,1 63,2 48,4 17,6 30,8  *** 
2002  67,4                            28,8 5,3 14,1 22,4 57,2 62,3 41,1 29,5 43,3 37,1 62,7 50,0 17,8 32,2  *** 
2003  70,9                            37,8 5,3 14,4 21,4 59,1 70,4 45,4 29,4 42,6 39,7 64,2 54,4 17,6 36,7  *** 
2004
(e)  72,6                            37,8 4,8 14,6 21,1 59,7 72,4 47,7 30,9 44,2 40,6 64,4 55,7 17,9 37,9  *** 
2005
(f)  72,4                            39,4 4,4 15,4 21,7 59,5 73,7 49,8 30,8 45,2 41,2 64,5 56,7 18,1 38,6  *** 
2006
(f)  69,4                            40,6 4,2 16,6 21,3 58,9 74,2 49,3 30,6 45,9 41,1 64,3 56,4 18,2 38,2  *** 
Source: GENERAL GOVERNMENT DATA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL ECFIN, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, PART II: TABLES BY 
SERIES, AUTUMN 2004. Note: *** significant on 1 %, ** significant on 5 % and * significant on 10 %. 
(e) denotes expected and 
(f) forecasted value. 
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